Israeli Peacemaking Since 1967

Examining the Israeli-Arab conflict as an "e;intractable conflict,"e; Israeli Peacemaking since 1967 seeks to determine just which factors, or combination of factors, impacted on Israel's position in past peace-making efforts, possibly accounting for breakthroughs or failures to reach agreement.From King Hussein's little known overtures immediately after the Six-Day War, through President Sadat's futile efforts to avoid war in the early 1970s, to repeated third-party-mediated talks with Syria, factors including deep-seated mistrust, leadership style, and domestic political spoilers contributed to failures even as public opinion and international circumstances may have been favourable. How these and other factors intervened, changed or were handled, allowing for the few breakthroughs (with Egypt and Jordan) or the near breakthrough of the Annapolis process with the Palestinians, provides not only an understanding of the past but possible keys for future Israeli-Arab peace efforts. Employing extensive use of archival material, as well as interviews and thorough research of available sources, this book provides insight on just which factors, or combination of factors, account for breakthroughs or failures to reach agreement; a framework useful for examining both the Israeli-Arab conflict and intractable conflicts in general.

Autorentext
Galia Golan is a leading Israeli political scientist, formerly head of the Political Science Department at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, currently Head of the M.A. and Conflict Resolution Programs at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya (IDC) and the author of ten books, addressing the Arab-Israeli conflict. She has also co-edited a volume with Walid Salem, Non-State Actors in the Middle East: Factors for Peace and Democracy, (Routledge, 2013).

Zusammenfassung
Examining the Israeli-Arab conflict as an "intractable conflict," Israeli Peacemaking since 1967 seeks to determine just which factors, or combination of factors, impacted on Israel's position in past peace-making efforts, possibly accounting for breakthroughs or failures to reach agreement.From King Hussein's little known overtures immediately after the Six-Day War, through President Sadat's futile efforts to avoid war in the early 1970s, to repeated third-party-mediated talks with Syria, factors including deep-seated mistrust, leadership style, and domestic political spoilers contributed to failures even as public opinion and international circumstances may have been favourable. How these and other factors intervened, changed or were handled, allowing for the few breakthroughs (with Egypt and Jordan) or the near breakthrough of the Annapolis process with the Palestinians, provides not only an understanding of the past but possible keys for future Israeli-Arab peace efforts. Employing extensive use of archival material, as well as interviews and thorough research of available sources, this book provides insight on just which factors, or combination of factors, account for breakthroughs or failures to reach agreement; a framework useful for examining both the Israeli-Arab conflict and intractable conflicts in general.

Inhalt
Introduction 1 1967-68 Failure 2 Breakthrough with Egypt 3 Failure on the Syrian Track 4 Jordan Again 5 Oslo I - Breakthrough and Failure 6 Oslo II - Barak and Camp David 7 Olmert's Near-Breakthroughs: Annapolis Process and Syrian Talks Conclusion

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