The Threat of Force in International Law

This book examines the relationship between military coercion and international law.

Autorentext
Senior research fellow at the World Trade Institute and visiting lecturer in international and constitutional law at the University of Basel.

Klappentext
Threats of force are a common feature of international politics, advocated by some as an economical guarantee against the outbreak of war and condemned by others as a recipe for war. Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter forbids states to use threats of force, yet the meaning of the prohibition is unclear. This book provides the first comprehensive appraisal of the no-threat principle: its origin, underlying rationale, theoretical implications, relevant jurisprudence, and how it has withstood the test of time from 1945 to the present. Based on a systematic evaluation of state and United Nations practices, the book identifies what constitutes a threat of force and when its use is justified under the United Nations Charter. In so doing, it relates the no-threat principle to important concepts of the twentieth century, such as deterrence, escalation, crisis management, and what has been aptly described as the 'diplomacy of violence'.

Zusammenfassung
The United Nations Charter prohibits states to threaten the use of force vis-à-vis another state, but what conduct is prohibited is unclear. This book fills this gap by exploring what forms of military coercion are permitted by international law, when such coercion is justified, and how norm-breakers are dealt with.

Inhalt
1. Birth and infancy of a Charter rule: the open framework; 2. The menu of choice: a guide to interpretation; 3. Precedents of the International Court; 4. Deciphering post-Charter practice: means and limits; 5. Open threats to extract concessions; 6. Demonstrations of force; 7. Countervailing threats or threats in self-defence; 8. Findings and conclusions; 9. Epilogue: the law in operation.

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