The Sanctions Paradox

Argues that, paradoxically, countries are likely to use sanctions under conditions where they will produce the feeblest results.

Zusammenfassung
The conventional wisdom is that economic sanctions do not work in international affairs. If so, why do countries wield them so often? This 1999 book argues that, paradoxically, countries are most likely to be willing to use sanctions under conditions where they will produce the feeblest results.

Inhalt
1. Introduction; Part I. Theory and Data: 2. A model of economic coercion; 3. Plausibility probes; 4. Statistical tests; Part II. Economic Coercion in the Former Soviet Union: 5. Russian power and preferences; 6. The extent of NIS concessions; 7. Evaluating the evidence; Part III. Choosing Between Carrots and Sticks: 8. Economic statecraft and nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula; 9. Conclusions, implications, speculations.

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