The Arrow Impossibility Theorem

Kenneth Arrow's pathbreaking impossibility theorem was a watershed in the history of welfare economics, voting theory, and collective choice, demonstrating that there is no voting rule that satisfies the four desirable axioms of decisiveness, consensus, nondictatorship, and independence. In this book, Amartya Sen and Eric Maskin explore the implications of Arrows theorem. Sen considers its ongoing utility, exploring the theorems value and limitations in relation to recent research on social reasoning, while Maskin discusses how to design a voting rule that gets us closer to the ideal - given that achieving the ideal is impossible. The volume also contains a contextual introduction by social choice scholar Prasanta K. Pattanaik and commentaries from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth Arrow himself, as well as essays by Sen and Maskin outlining the mathematical proof and framework behind their assertions.

Autorentext
Eric Maskin is the Adams University Professor at Harvard University. He received the 2007 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics (with L. Hurwicz and R. Myerson) for laying the foundations of mechanism design theory. He has also contributed to game theory, contract theory, social choice theory, political economy, and other areas of economics.

Amartya Sen is the Thomas W. Lamont University Professor and Professor of Economics and Philosophy at Harvard University. In 1998 he was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, and in 1999 he was awarded the Bharat Ratna, India's highest civilian award. He is also a senior fellow at the Harvard Society of Fellows; distinguished fellow of All Souls College, Oxford; and a Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. His books have been translated into more than thirty languages.

Klappentext
Nobel prize-winning economists revisit Kenneth J. Arrow's groundbreaking work on voting habits and outcomes.


Zusammenfassung
Kenneth J. Arrow's "impossibility theorem" was a watershed in welfare economics, voting theory, and collective choice. This book explores the implications of Arrow's theorem. Amartya Sen considers its value and limitations in relation to social reasoning, and Eric Maskin discusses how to design a voting rule that gets us closer to the ideal.

Inhalt
Acknowledgments
Introduction, by Prasanta K. Pattanaik
Part 1: The Lectures
Opening Remarks, by Joseph E. Stiglitz
Arrow and the Impossibility Theorem, by Amartya Sen
The Arrow Impossibility Theorem: Where Do We Go From Here?, by Eric Maskin
Commentary, by Kenneth J. Arrow
Part II: Supplemental Materials
The Informational Basis of Social Choice, by Amartya Sen
On The Robustness of Majority Rule, by Partha Dasgupta and Eric Maskin
The Origins of the Impossibility Theorem, by Kenneth J. Arrow
Notes on Contributors

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