Seeing Things as They are

Informationen zum Autor
John R. Searle is Willis S. and Marion Slusser Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley. His previous publications include Making the Social World (2010) and Mind: A Brief introduction (2004), both from Oxford University Press.

Inhaltsverzeichnis
Preface ; Chapter 1: The Bad Argument ; Appendix A to Chapter 1: Summary of the Theory of Intentionality ; Appendix B to Chapter 1: Consciousness ; Chapter 2: The Intentionality of Perceptual Experiences ; Chapter 3: Further Developments of the Argument Against the Bad Argument ; Chapter 4: How Perceptual Intentionality Works I: Basic Features, Causation, and Intentional Content ; Chapter 5: How Perceptual Intentionality Works II: Extending the Analysis to Non-basic Features ; Chapter 6: Disjunctivism ; Chapter 7: Unconscious Perception ; Chapter 8: Classical Theories of Perception



Searle's book is a wonderful addition to the philosophical discipline of perception, and a useful way for someone who is not well versed in the subject to receive and extensive overview of the historical arguments. The overarching thesis is a strong defense of Direct Realism that will inspire the reader to contemplate the ways they discern meaning through experience.

Autorentext
John R. Searle is Willis S. and Marion Slusser Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley. His previous publications include Making the Social World (2010) and Mind: A Brief introduction (2004), both from Oxford University Press.

Klappentext
This book provides a comprehensive account of the intentionality of perceptual experience. With special emphasis on vision Searle explains how the raw phenomenology of perception sets the content and the conditions of satisfaction of experience.

Inhalt
Preface
Chapter 1: The Bad Argument
Appendix A to Chapter 1: Summary of the Theory of Intentionality
Appendix B to Chapter 1: Consciousness
Chapter 2: The Intentionality of Perceptual Experiences
Chapter 3: Further Developments of the Argument Against the Bad Argument
Chapter 4: How Perceptual Intentionality Works I: Basic Features, Causation, and Intentional Content
Chapter 5: How Perceptual Intentionality Works II: Extending the Analysis to Non-basic Features
Chapter 6: Disjunctivism
Chapter 7: Unconscious Perception
Chapter 8: Classical Theories of Perception

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