The CIA and the Culture of Failure

The 9/11 attacks and the war in Iraq sprang from massive intelligence failures. To help us understand how and why such failures occur, the author analyzes key events from the end of the Cold War - when the CIA's main mission of spying on the Soviet Union ceased to exist - to 9/11 and the war in Iraq.

"The CIA and the Culture of Failure is a very important work that focuses on intelligence and policy issues that are of immediate interest in dealing with key crisis areas like Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. No one can be definitive in a field where so much is classified, but this book frames a key debate over the future of intelligence that deserves broad attention by the Administration, the Congress, and the intelligence community. The work is solid, well-thought out, and covers a wide range of sources without bias; and without academic, ideological, or political prejudice."

Autorentext
John Diamond is communications director for Senator Maria Cantwell, D-WA. He has written about defense, intelligence, and foreign affairs in Washington for the Associated Press, Chicago Tribune, and USA Today.

Klappentext
"The CIA and the Culture of Failure" follows the CIA through a series of crises from the Soviet collapse to the war in Iraq and explains the political pressures that helped lead to the greatest failures in U.S. intelligence history.


Zusammenfassung
The 9/11 attacks and the war in Iraq sprang in no small part from massive intelligence failures, that much is well understood. How the CIA got to a point where it could fail so catastrophically is not. According to John Diamond, this slippage results from the tendency to overlook the links between seemingly unrelated intelligence failures and to underestimate the impact of political pressure on the CIA: factors we need to examine to understand both the origin and magnitude of the 9/11 and Iraq intelligence failures. To bring these links to light, Diamond analyzes the CIAs role in key events from the end of the Cold War (when the Soviet Unionand thus the CIAs main missioncame to an end) to the war in Iraq. His account explores both CIA successes and failures in the Soviet break-up, the Gulf War, the Ames spy case, the response to al-Qaedas initial attacks, and the US/UN effort to contain and disarm Iraq. By putting into historical perspective the intelligence failures--both real and perceivedsurrounding these events, Diamond illuminates the links between lower-profile intelligence controversies in the early post-Cold War period and the high-profile failures that continue to define the War on Terrorism.

#	Onlineshop	Preis CHF	Versand CHF	Total CHF
1	Seller	0.00	0.00	0.00