Classics in Game Theory

Zusatztext "This volume assembles in one sourcebook the basic contributions to the field [of game theory]. . ." Informationen zum Autor Harold W. Kuhn is Professor Emeritus of Mathematical Economics at Princeton University and is internationally known for his joint paper with the late Albert W. Tucker that initiated the theory of "nonlinear programming." In 1994, on the occasion of the awarding of the Nobel Prizes, he organized and chaired a historic Nobel Seminar on the work of John Nash in game theory; this seminar is published in Les Prix Nobel 1994 (Almquist & Wicksell, 1994). Klappentext Classics in Game Theory assembles in one sourcebook the basic contributions to the field that followed on the publication of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (Princeton, 1944). The theory of games, first given a rigorous formulation by von Neumann in a in 1928, is a subfield of mathematics and economics that models situations in which individuals compete and cooperate with each other. In the "heroic era" of research that began in the late 1940s, the foundations of the current theory were laid; it is these fundamental contributions that are collected in this volume. In the last fifteen years, game theory has become the dominant model in economic theory and has made significant contributions to political science, biology, and international security studies. The central role of game theory in economic theory was recognized by the award of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science in 1994 to the pioneering game theorists John C. Harsanyi, John Nash, and Reinhard Selten. The fundamental works for which they were honored are all included in this volume.Harold Kuhn, himself a major contributor to game theory for his reformulation of extensive games, has chosen eighteen essays that constitute the core of game theory as it exists today. Drawn from a variety of sources, they will be an invaluable tool for researchers in game theory and for a broad group of students of economics, political science, and biology. Zusammenfassung The theory of games, first given a rigorous formulation by von Neumann in 1928, is a subfield of mathematics and economics that models situations in which individuals compete and cooperate with each other. This book assembles the fundamental contributions in this field. It is useful for researchers in game theory and for students. Inhaltsverzeichnis Permissions Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games 2The Bargaining Problem 3Non-Cooperative Games 4An Iterative Method of Solving a Game 5Equivalence of Games in Extensive Form 6Extensive Games and the Problem and Information 7A Value for n-Person Games 8Stochastic Games 9Recursive Games 10Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions to Cooperative Games without Side Payments 11A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy 12The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games 13Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders 14The Core of an n-Person Game 15Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part I: The Basic Model Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part II: Bayesian Equilibrium Points Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part III: The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game 16The Big Match 17On Market Games 18Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games List of Contributors Index ...

Autorentext
Harold W. Kuhn is Professor Emeritus of Mathematical Economics at Princeton University and is internationally known for his joint paper with the late Albert W. Tucker that initiated the theory of "nonlinear programming." In 1994, on the occasion of the awarding of the Nobel Prizes, he organized and chaired a historic Nobel Seminar on the work of John Nash in game theory; this seminar is published in Les Prix Nobel 1994 (Almquist & Wicksell, 1994).

Klappentext
Classics in Game Theory assembles in one sourcebook the basic contributions to the field that followed on the publication of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (Princeton, 1944). The theory of games, first given a rigorous formulation by von Neumann in a in 1928, is a subfield of mathematics and economics that models situations in which individuals compete and cooperate with each other. In the "heroic era" of research that began in the late 1940s, the foundations of the current theory were laid; it is these fundamental contributions that are collected in this volume. In the last fifteen years, game theory has become the dominant model in economic theory and has made significant contributions to political science, biology, and international security studies. The central role of game theory in economic theory was recognized by the award of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science in 1994 to the pioneering game theorists John C. Harsanyi, John Nash, and Reinhard Selten. The fundamental works for which they were honored are all included in this volume. Harold Kuhn, himself a major contributor to game theory for his reformulation of extensive games, has chosen eighteen essays that constitute the core of game theory as it exists today. Drawn from a variety of sources, they will be an invaluable tool for researchers in game theory and for a broad group of students of economics, political science, and biology.

Zusammenfassung
The theory of games, first given a rigorous formulation by von Neumann in 1928, is a subfield of mathematics and economics that models situations in which individuals compete and cooperate with each other. This book assembles the fundamental contributions in this field. It is useful for researchers in game theory and for students.

Inhalt
Permissions Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games 2 The Bargaining Problem 3 Non-Cooperative Games 4 An Iterative Method of Solving a Game 5 Equivalence of Games in Extensive Form 6 Extensive Games and the Problem and Information 7 A Value for n-Person Games 8 Stochastic Games 9 Recursive Games 10 Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions to Cooperative Games without Side Payments 11 A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy 12 The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games 13 Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders 14 The Core of an n-Person Game 15 Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part I: The Basic Model Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part II: Bayesian Equilibrium Points Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part III: The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game 16 The Big Match 17 On Market Games 18 Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games List of Contributors Index

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