The German 1918 Offensives

This study evaluates in detail the German planning and decision-making process, from November 1917 to the start of August 1918, prior to their eventual defeat in World War One.

Presents a study of the Ludendorff Offensives of 1918 based extensively on key German records. This book demonstrates how the German failure to exploit the vulnerabilities in the BEF's rail system led to the failure of the first two offensives, and how inadequacies in the German rail system determined the outcome of the last three offensives.

Autorentext
David T. Zabecki has been Commanding General of the U.S. Southern European Task Force (Rear) and has served as the U.S. Department of Defense Executive Director for all World War II 60th anniversary commemoration events in Europe. In 2003 he was the Senior Security Advisor on the U.S. Coordinating and Monitoring Mission in Israel. The Editor of Vietnam Magazine, he has a PhD in Military Science from the Royal Military College of Science.

Inhalt
1. Why do we Still Bother with World War I? 2. The Operational Art 3. The Tactical Realities of 1918 4. The Strategic Reality 5. The Operational Decision: 11 November 1917 to 21 January 1918 6. Operations MICHAEL and MARS 7. Operation GEORGETTE 8. Operations BLÜCHER, GOERZ, and YORCK 9. Operations GNEISSENAU and HAMMERSCHLAG 10. Operation MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS 11. Operations HAGEN and KURFÜRST 12. Conclusions

#	Onlineshop	Preis CHF	Versand CHF	Total CHF
1	Seller	0.00	0.00	0.00