Learning from Conflict

Autorentext
Richard D. Downie

Klappentext
Why have militaries so often failed to learn from conflict and war? Why, for example, despite years of unsuccessful counterinsurgency experiences in Vietnam and El Salvador and repeated recommendations from official Army studies, has the U.S. Army not changed its doctrine for counterinsurgency? Writing for scholars as well as military professionals and policymakers, Downie examines the sources of doctrinal change and innovation from a theoretical perspective and derives practical and relevant policy recommendations.

Contrasting with other findings in this field, Downie provides case studies showing that neither external pressure on a military nor institutional recognition of the requirement for doctrinal change is sufficient to explain the process of doctrinal change. A military innovates when it learns, by proceeding through a learning cycle that includes achieving an organizational consensus that permits adoption of new approaches that respond to factors that make existing doctrine deficient. When that process is blocked, militaries are left with outmoded doctrinal approaches that constrain military performance and lead to defeat. This is an important study for military leaders, civilian policymakers, and scholars and researchers dealing with contemporary U.S. military issues.

Inhalt
Preface and Reader's Guide Abbreviations Introduction and Theoretical Overview Overview and Background The Sources of Doctrinal Change: Structuring Contending Explanations Development and Evolution of U.S. Doctrine for Counterinsurgency and LIC Case Study 1: Analyzing Change to Published Doctrine for Counterinsurgency in the Post-Vietnam War Era Official Army Studies on Counterinsurgency and Identifying Shortcomings Counterinsurgency Doctrine in the Post-Vietnam War Era: Has There Been Conceptual Change? Did the U.S. Army Learn?: Assessing the Doctrinal Evidence Case Study 2: Testing for Doctrinal Continuity: The U.S. Counterinsurgency Assistance Effort in El Salvador "Drawing the Line" in Central America: U.S. Counterinsurgency Assistance in El Salvador Counterinsurgency from Vietnam to El Salvador: Testing for Doctrinal Continuity Why Didn't Counterinsurgency Doctrine Change After the Vietnam War: Testing Hypotheses Case Study 3: Testing for Doctrinal Change or Continuity: The Drug War in the Andean Ridge Fighting The Drug War on the Andean Ridge Explaining Doctrinal Change: The Drug War on the Andean Ridge Conclusions and Recommendations Theoretical Conclusions Recommendations: LIC and Military Organizations as Learning Institutions Appendix: Measuring Change in Doctrine for Counterinsurgency Selected Bibliography Index

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