The Theory of Incentives

Zusatztext "Incentive theory is at the very core of economics. This text is a masterly exposition of the modern theory by one of the pioneers of the field! Jean-Jacques Laffont! together with one of its rising stars! David Martimort." -Eric Maskin! Institute for Advanced Study Informationen zum Autor Jean-Jacques Laffont is Professor of Economics and Director of the Institut d'Economie Industrielle (IDEI) at the University of Social Sciences in Toulouse! one of Europe's leading centers for the study of economics. He has won a number of prestigious awards for his research and is a former President of the European Economic Association and of the Econometric Society. His books include The Economics of Uncertainty and Information! Fundamentals of Public Economics! Incentives and Political Economy ! and he is the coauthor of Incentives in Public Decision Making! A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation! and Competition in Telecommunications . David Martimort is Professor of Economics and a research fellow of the IDEI at the University of Social Sciences in Toulouse. He has been a visiting professor at Harvard! MIT! Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona! ECARE in Brussels! and is a member of the Center for Economic and Policy Research in the United Kingdom. He is Associate Editor of the Rand Journal of Economics . Klappentext "Incentive theory is at the very core of economics. This text is a masterly exposition of the modern theory by one of the pioneers of the field! Jean-Jacques Laffont! together with one of its rising stars! David Martimort."--Eric Maskin! Institute for Advanced Study"This book will surely be the standard technical reference in an important field for a number of years--possibly for many if the field ceases to develop so rapidly. It is indeed a fine contribution to the economics literature."--Sir James Mirrlees! Cambridge University! 1996 Nobel Laureate in Economic Sciences"The most important development in economics in the last forty years has been the study of incentives to achieve potential mutual gains when the parties have different degrees of knowledge. The time is ripe for a synthesis and systematization. Jean-Jacques Laffont has been one of the most important contributors to the field over the years! and David Martimort has shown his capacity for highly original work. This book! dealing with the basic models of the field! combines clarity! thoroughness! and great respect for historical development."--Kenneth J. Arrow! Stanford University! 1972 Nobel Laureate in Economic Sciences Zusammenfassung Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Inhaltsverzeichnis 104598222 ...

Autorentext
Jean-Jacques Laffont is Professor of Economics and Director of the Institut d'Economie Industrielle (IDEI) at the University of Social Sciences in Toulouse, one of Europe's leading centers for the study of economics. He has won a number of prestigious awards for his research and is a former President of the European Economic Association and of the Econometric Society. His books include The Economics of Uncertainty and Information, Fundamentals of Public Economics, Incentives and Political Economy, and he is the coauthor of Incentives in Public Decision Making, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, and Competition in Telecommunications. David Martimort is Professor of Economics and a research fellow of the IDEI at the University of Social Sciences in Toulouse. He has been a visiting professor at Harvard, MIT, Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona, ECARE in Brussels, and is a member of the Center for Economic and Policy Research in the United Kingdom. He is Associate Editor of the Rand Journal of Economics.

Klappentext
Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits? Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.

Zusammenfassung
Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability.

Inhalt
xi Foreword
Introduction 1
1 Incentives in Economic Thought 7
1.1 Adam Smith and Incentive Contracts in Agriculture 8
1.2 Chester Barnard and Incentives in Management 11
1.3 Hume, Wicksell, Groves: The Free-Rider Problem 14
1.4 Borda, Bowen, Vickrey: Incentives in Voting 15
1.5 Leon Walras and the Regulation of Natural Monopolies 18
1.6 Knight, Arrow, Pauly: Incentives in Insurance 18
1.7 Sidgwick, Vickrey, Mirrlees: Redistribution and Incentives 20
1.8 Dupuit, Edgeworth, Pigou: Price Discrimination 22
1.9 Incentives in Planned Economies 23
1.10 Leonid Hurwicz and Mechanism Design 25
1.11 Auctions 27
2 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off 28
2.1 The Basic Model 32
2.2 The Complete Information Optimal Contract 33
2.3 Incentive Feasible Menu of Contracts 36
2.4 Information Rents 39
2.5 The Optimization Program of the Principal 40
2.6 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off 41
2.7 The Theory of the Firm Under Asymmetric Information 46
2.8 Asymmetric Information and Marginal Cost Pricing 48
2.9 The Revelation Principle 48
2.10 A More General Utility Function for the Agent 51
2.11 Ex Ante versus Ex Post Participation Constraints 57
2.12 Commitment 63
2.13 Stochastic Mechanisms 65
2.14 Informative Signals to Improve Contracting 68
2.15 Contract Theory at Work 72
Appendix 81
3 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Adverse Selection 82
3.1 More than Two Types 86
3.2 Multidimensional Asymmetric Information 93
3.3 Type-Dependent Participation Constraint and Countervailing Incentives 101
3.4 Random Participation Constraint 115
3.5 Limited Liability 118
3.6 Audit Mechanisms and Costly …

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